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employment. The empirical work is framed by a job search model with learning, 
where self-employment is an alternative for jobless workers. Consistent with 
the model's prediction, we find that for both spain and the United States, 
duration of unemployment significantly increases the probability of becoming 
self-employed. Further analysis showed that part-time work and the absence of 
Social Security coverage are more likely to be aseociated with self-employed 
workers. We also find that, in Spain, those self-employed who do not hire any 
persone earn eignificantly less than other comparable workers. 
,r Key words 
Self-employment; job search model; expected income; reservation wage¡ joblees¡ 
duration of unemployment; entrepreneurs • 
• I am grateful for the suggestions made by John Abowd, David Blanchflower, 
Henry Farber, Richard Freeman, Robert Gibbons, Peter Gottschalk, Andrew 
Oewald, Lawrence Katz, Lisa Lynch, Bruce Meyer and participants in a meeting 
of members of the NBER's Program in Labor Studies. I thank Cynthia C08tas for 
invaluable help in editing thie work. I gratefully acknowledge a grant from 
the Spanieh Ministry of Education and Science in cooperation with the 
Fulbright Commi8sion during the second year of my Post-Doctoral Fellow8hip at 
Harvard university and the National Bureau of Economic Re8earch. 
1 
"Ms. Gantka spent most of her career as a 
secretary and was laid off in November. Now 
she is the president, proprietor and sole 
employee of the 0011 Company." 
The New York Times, May 16, 1990. 
1. lntroduction 
Recently, economists and policymakers have become increasingly concerned 
with the role of small businesses in the economy. One reason for this interest 
is the recent growth of self-employment among some OECD countries. 1 High 
levels of unemp10yment in the late 1970's and early 1980's hint that 
unemployment might be a contributing factor for the observed increase in self-
employment. In the midst of high unemp10yment, establishing a business becomes 
a plausible alternative for the jobless. 2 Self-employment not only solves an 
individual's unemployment problem, it also places a potentia1 employer in the 
labor market. Yet this proposition remains to be tested. In general, we know 
little about the characteristics and circumstances associated with the workers 
who, sooner or later in their life, decide or are prompted to become 
"entrepreneurs". 
In periods of high employment and growth there is not much incentive for 
self-employment, because it is more efficient to join fast-growing firms than 
create new ones. The reasons for this are greater productivity, the existence 
of economies of scale and increased competitiveness. We can consequently 
observe a secular reduction in self-employment. since the mid-seventies, that 
tendency has been reversed with regard to non-agricultural self-employment. 
Such a reversal parallels increased unemployment rates in western economies. 
Moreover, deep structural changes have occurred and the service sector has 
.. 
I See OECD 1986. 
2 Legislation aimed at helping the jobless start-up their own businesses 
has been implemented in Europe and in the United States. Spain enacted a law 
in 1985 to provide lump-sum unemployment insurance to workers wil1ing to 
become self-employed. As the Fall of 1989, jobless persons in the state of 
Washington (U.S.) can apply to the Self-Employment and Enterprise Development 
project (SEED), which allocates lump-sum unemployment insurance and provides 
training for some of those who want to create a small business. This measure 
has been extended to other states in the U.S. 
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expanded substantially. How these other factors contribute to self-employrnent 
is an empirical question yet to be addressed. 3 
This article studies the relationship between unemployrnent and self-
employrnent at a microeconomic level. To do that, we link self-employrnent to 
duration of unemployrnent. In order to assess if self-employrnent is a worthy 
choice for long-term unemployed, we further make an attempt to see how well 
matched self-employed workers are to their jobs. Moreover, to deBcribe various 
features of Belf-employed workers, we compare demographic and previouB job 
characteriBticB of the currently Belf-employed to thoBe of wage and Balary 
workers. 4 
The empirical work in this study focuses on Spain and the United States. 
Spain is a fruitful case for analyzing the relationship between unemployrnent 
and self-employrnent. The reasonB are that Spanish unemployrnent Btarted to grow 
in the mid-1970's and peaked in 1985, and that there iB a predominance of 
small-sized firms in the country.5 Our comparison of the United StateB and 
Spain serves to assess particularities of the Spanish case and, thereby, 
allows us to arrive at more general conclusions. We use duration of 
unemployrnent data for workers who have changed firms in Spain and for those 
displaced from their jobs in the United States. 
One result of our analysis is that, after controlling for workers who did 
not experience unemployrnent in Spain or the United States, duration of a prior 
unemployrnent spell significantly increases the probability of current self-
employrnent status. For both countries we also find evidence of a higher 
3 In this article, we do not try to diBtinguish the growth of Belf-
employrnent from Belection into Belf-employrnent. 
4 Sorne of the factorB which motivate the creation of Bmall bUBineBBeB are 
the following: social environment, diBsatiBfaction with paid work, perBonality 
differences, family circumBtanceB, deBire for profits, availability ol aBBetB, 
possession of Bkills and technology, willingneBB to take riBks, or Bimply, the 
necessity to "Burvive". Sorne of theBe factorB are elusive to an economic 
analysis, but fortunately, sorne of them are noto 
5 The characteriBtics of Spanish workerB managing small busineBBeB 
reveals the typeB of entrepreneurBhip which develop in economies which are in 
a process of modernization and reBtructuring. Moreover, better knowledge of 
Bmall firms helps us to anticipate the effectB of the European Single Market 
on the performance of the SpaniBh economy. 
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probability of part-time work among self-employed workers; a circumstance that 
is more likely to be associated with workers who suffered a longer 
unemployment spell before re-employment. Another result is that the wage 
differences between self-employed and wage and salary workers depend on the 
firm size owned by the self-employed workers. Self-employed workers without 
employees earn 22' less, whereas those self-employed with over S employees 
earn 26' more than wage and salary workers in Spain. 
11. Conceptual and Eapirical Fraaework 
Most predictions on the behavior of workers facing the choice between 
dependent work and self-employment are derived from fragmented theories, 
previously observed facts or basic economic principIes. Thus far, insufficient 
effort has been made to understand the generation and evolution of 
entrepreneurship. 
Sorne of the literature stresses that one feature distinguishing self-
e employment from wage and salary work is the degree of risk-taking. Based on 
this fundamental aspect of self-employment, namely, the risk involved, sorne 
authors like Knight (1921), Kanbur (1979) and Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979), 
have built up their models on entrepreneurship. In an aggregate context, Blau 
(1987) has tried to model the relationships between the proportion of self-
employment and variables such as relative prices, technology and tax 
structures. Using a consumer discrimination framework, Borjas and Bronars 
(1989) generate sorne predictions about the distribution of income and 
proportions of self-employment by ethnic and racial groups. Evans and 
Jovanovic (1989) develop a model of selection into entrepreneurship based on 
the existence of liquidity constraints. Lucas (1978) takes "entrepreneurial 
ability" to explain the choice of self-employment. Other theories, grounded in 
psychology and sociology, emphasize motivation and social relations in 
explaining the creation of small businesses. To date, however, little 
attention has been paid to the relationship between unemployment and self-
employment. 6 
6 See Evans and Leighton (1989) for sorne evidence. 
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When modeling the selection into self-employment, the typical worker is 
assumed to compare the expected income from wage and salary work with the 
expected income from self-employment. Self-employment is chosen if greater 
income results.' A non-rationed supply of labor is implicitly assumed, i.e., 
there are plenty of jobs at the market wages. Under high unemployment, this 
assumption is unrealistic. Workers who face limited opportunities for 
obtaining a wage and salary job have drastically constrained income streams. 
Unemployment has two main effects on workers: (1) Specific skills are 
lost and general human capital deteriorates. Thus, as time out of work 
lengthens, the probability of getting the desired job diminishes. (2) As a 
result of joblessness, some income is not earned. Furthermore, job search is 
costly and, in a learning environment, the reservation wage declines with job 
search tenure. 8 Thus, duration of unemployment becomes a key variable which 
indicates the difficulties in finding wage and salary work, along with the 
financial loss associated with pursuing it. In this context, self-employment, 
so long as it is endogenously determined, becomes a viable alternative for 
jobless workers. 
Unemployed workers not only learn about the job market (job offers and 
wage offer distribution), but also they catch on to business opportunities. In 
the hardship of joblessness, the worker's underlying managerial ability (mix 
of creativity and boldness) flourishes or is reinforced out of necessity. For 
those workere who have not decided to employ themselves before experiencing 
unemployment, self-employment becomee more attractive or acceptable as 
duration of unemployment is prolonged. 
The process would develop as follows: As duration of unemployment 
lengthens, the decline in the reservation wage decreases9 the expected wage 
and salary income. The worker will stop looking for paid work when the 
, See e.g. Blau (1987) and Evane and Jovanovic (1989). 
• See Mortensen (1986) for the standard search modelo For models that 
predict a declining reservation wage in a learning environment, see Burdett 
and Vishwanath (1988) and McCall (1989). 
9 We assume that the reservation wage does not depend on business 
opportunities.  
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expected income that can be obtained from dependent employment falls below the 
expected income that can be generated from self-employment. The latter is 
assumed constant over the search periodo Nonetheless, it can increase if, as 
stated earlier, some business opportunities are further revealed. 1o OUr 
informal model predicts that, given search costs, an initial reservation wage, 
managerial ability, business start-up assets and other conditions," some 
workers become readily self-employed upon leaving or losing their jobs if 
their expected income from self-employment is greater than their expected 
income from wage and salary work. 12 other workers must experience unemployment 
before they enter self-e~ployment. 
We would expect that in an economy without self-employment, joblessness 
would last longer and more workers would withdraw from the labor force. In 
other words, economic forces driving workers into self-employment should 
reduce duration of unemployment and prevent some workers from dropping out of 
the labor market. Moreover, our model highlights two sets of self-employed 
workers: those without unemployment and those with an intervening spell of 
unemployment. If the reason for becoming self-employed affects the likelihood 
of the business to improve over time, the most likely to last and grow are 
those businesses owned by persons who were selected into self-employment 
without a spell of unemployment. 13 
10 See Wall Street Journal, November 28, 1990, for a discussion of 
business opportunities in periods of recession. 
," 11 The model allows for the role of managerial experience or ability, 
liquidity constraints, changes in industrial structure and technology, and 
other economic or personal characteristics to determine the pool of potential 
entrepreneurs. 
12 Some wage and salary workers at times simultaneously hold self-
employment as a secondary jobo Upon unemployment threat or actual 
displacement, self-employment becomes their sole jobo In light of these 
circumstances, dual job holders tend not to report unemployment. Another 
reason for this to happen might be that they did some job searching while 
employed. 
13 A successful entrepreneur is one whose firm grows. In the context of 
understanding entrepreneurship as a process of undertaking, innovation and 
r,  profit maximization, the distinction between the self-employed with and 
without employees may be relevant. In this work, we find some suggestive 
differences between the self-employed with and those without employees. We 
have observed that the growth of self-employment in Spain corresponds to those 
business owners without employees. Only the self-employed who hire other 
workers might be considered entrepreneurs, or "undertakers" as expressed by 
r" 
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Empirical Frarnework 
According to our informal model, the worker who has left or lost a wage 
and salary job decides to become eelf-employed if the expected income from 
doing so ie higher than the expected income from another wage and ealary jobo 
When unemployment takes place, expected income from both sources are 
e 
reevaluated throughout the search period, thus generating a dynamic process. 
Suppose that the expected income from self-employment is ~ and the 
expected income of wage and salary work is Mw. Then the choice of self-
employment is made upon the sign of the following equation: 
where p. expresses the income differential between self-employment and wage 
and salary work, Z contains all the variables that affect ~ and Mw, w 
indicates the reduced-form impact of the personal and economic variables on 
p., and ~ is an error termo We do not observe p., but we observe the outcome ofe 
the decision process, which is a dichotomous variable P. The probit model 
results: 
e P = 1 if p. > o (~> - Zw) 
P = o if p. s o (~s - Zw) 
r"" Since expected income from wage and salary work depends on the 
reservation wage, and we assume that this diminishes with duration of 
unemployment, the main hypothesis we wish to test emerges: Given joble.eness, 
the longer is the duration of unemployment the more likely i. that we observe 
workers entering self-employment. In Z we include other demographic and 
economic characteristics that may affect the expected income from both 
Cantillon (1755). The workers who create their own jobs without hiring other 
workers are more likely to seek se1f-employment as a temporary alternative, 
with the underlying expectation of finding a job as wage and ealary workers at 
a future time. Enterprises, however, require lead time to develop. Those sole 
employees of their companies are candidates for successful employers. 
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sources: gender, marital status, age, education, tenure, reasons for job loss 
or quitting, etc. 
A number of studies have addressed the demographic characteristics of 
self-employed workers in the United States and the United Kingdom.J~ Host 
researchers have found that the self-employed person is more likely to be 
male, married, older and more educated than salary and wage workers. These 
four features are associated with two fundamental requirements to start-up a 
small business: Availability of financial resources and managerial skills. 
However, little research has been undertaken on the relationship between self-
employrnent and unemployrnent. 
111. Data 
The Spanish data used in this study are from the Working and Living 
Conditions Survey (hereinafter ECVT), a government sponsored household survey 
carried out in the fourth quarter of 1985 in Spain. Its goal, to assess the 
e importance of the concealed sector in the labor market, and sample size, more 
than 60,000 interviewees, make the ECVT a nation-wide representative survey 
with extensive information on the Spanish labor force. 
In the ECVT, all workers were asked if they had changed firms any time in 
their working life. Those who responded in the affirmative were further 
questioned about their reason for changing firms, their previous and current 
job characteristics, and their duration of unemployrnent. The class of worker 
(wage and salary, self-employed or family aid) is known for the previous and 
the current jobo 
For purposes of this work, we concentrate on workers who have moved from 
a previous non-agricultural wage and salary job. u th the analysis, workers 
will be classified into three groups according to the reasons for moving: 
workers who quit or voluntarily moved, workers who were displaced from their 
J~ See Blanchflower and Heyer (1990), Blanchflower and Oswald (1990), 
Heyer (1990), Evans and Leighton (1989), Borjas (1986), Rees and Shah (1986), 
Becker (1984), and Fuchs (1982). 
u Workers who reported that they have never changed firms are not 
included in our sample. 
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jobs (individually fired, firm bankruptcy, cutback on work, end of contract), 
and workers who moved for other reasons (retirement, marriage, birth, military 
service, other). Workers for whom duration of unemployment was missing or who 
reported more than 120 months out of work were deleted. Also, some 
observations with missing values for the relevant variables considered were 
ruled out. We are left with 7,657 individuals, of whom 20.6\ reported to be 
self-employed. 
The U.S. datal6 are from the Displaced Worker Survey (hereinafter DWS), a 
supplement to the Current Population survey in 1984, 1986 and 1988. This data 
set contains ample information regarding workers' previous and current jobs, 
together with aspects related to the transition period, e.g., duration of 
unemployment and collection of unemployment insurance. 17 The reasons given for 
displacement are plant closing, slack work and abolished position or shift. 
only white workers aged 20 to 61 years, who were displaced from non-
agricultural, wage and salary full-time jobs are considered. 
Due to the impossibility of separating single from multiple spells of 
unemployment in the 1984 survey, we use only the 1986 and 1988 surveys. After 
deleting observations for which missing values in relevant variables exist, a 
limited sample of 5,282 re-employed workers is yielded. The reported class of 
worker allows us to distinguish those who hold wage and salary jobs from those 
who are self-employed (incorporated as well as unincorporated) at survey date. 
IV. Self-Eaployaent in an Bconoay of Bigh Une.ployaentz Spain 
Taken from the Spanish Labor Force Survey (EPA), Figure 1 ehows the 
distribution of employment among class of worker for various years. The 
approximately 1.8 million decline in the number of jobs from 1976 to 1985 was 
almost recovered the following four years. The evo1ution of the number of wage 
16 1 am grateful to Lawrence Katz for kindly providing extracte from the 
Displaced Worker Supplements. 
17 The lack of wages for self-employed workers is an unfortunate missing 
feature of these data.  
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and salary workers and the number of self-employed with employees 
(employers)18 mirrors the general trend in employment. However, those self-
employed workers without employees have grown from 1976 to 1989. The rate of 
increase is 5.1\ from 1976 to 1981, and 11.8\ from 1981 to 1985. 19 As the 
graph indicates, the reduction of employment was much lower in the second 
phase of the economic recession (1981-1985). At the end of 1985, the 
unemployment rate reached 22\ and the mass of displaced workers had little 
chance to escape unemployment.~ 
Table 2 reflects the proportions of self-employment by current job tenure 
in the ECVT sample used.~1 The table illustrates the flow of workers into 
self-employment, conditional on their being employed at the survey date.~ 
Approximately 21\ of previous wage and salary workers who entered employment 
in 1980 or before, and who remained employed at the end of 1985, were 
currently self-employed; and about 16\ were self-employed without employees. 
Among those who began their jobs between 1981 and 1984, the proportion of the 
self-employed increased. However, Table 2 shows a substantially reduced 
e: probability that those workers who started their new job in 1985 shifted to 
self-employment. As noted above, in 1985 employment began to recover in Spain. 
It can be inferred, therefore, that the evolution of self-employed workers 
without employees in Spain has been counter-cyclical in the late 1970's and 
throughout the 1980's; whereas, evolution of the Spanish self-employed with 
employees in the same period has been pro-cyclical. 
18 The number of employers decreased by 20\ from 1976 to 1985. 
Nevertheless, their number grew by 24\ during the following four years. 
19 Self-employed without employees still grew from 1985 to 1987 by 7.5\, 
but stabilized the following two years. 
~ See Alba and Freeman (1990) for an analysis of duration of unemployment 
among displaced workers in Spain. 
21 No differences in the results were observed when the sample was 
weighted. 
~ Since our sample is a cross-section of workers, those self-employed in 
the survey are workers who have remained so after entering self-employment. 
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Self-Employment and Duration of Unemployment 
In analyzing the relationship between self-employment and unemployment in 
this article, some limitations with regard to the data used should be 
highlighted. First, when we look at the transition of wage and salary workers 
to self-employment, we cannot separate the probabilities of a worker's switch 
to and permanence in self-employment. Current job tenure will be used to 
partly control for this. Second, the data provide us with the last firm change 
of each worker. Although we know the number of times workers have changed 
firms, we do not have information on whether or not those workers who have 
changed more than once have had previous eelf-employment experience. In our 
regressions, we control for the number of firm changes. Third, during the 
recession period, it was a frequent practice among Spanish firms to convert 
wage and salary workers into independent contractors, a form of self-
employment, in order to lower costs and enhance productivity. Given we only 
consider that a change in the class of worker results from a change in firm, 
we reduce the likelihood of reported change in the class of worker as a reeult 
of contract conversion.~ 
In the following probit regressions on the probability of entering eelf-
employment, the dependent variable takes on 1 if the previously wage and 
salary worker shifted to self-employment and remained as such, and O 
otherwise. Table 2 shows that males, married women, elders, less educated~ 
and longer tenured workers in the previous job are more likely to have become 
self-employed. Workers older than 64 years are more likely to be self-employed 
than other workers.~ 
Furthermore, we find that, consistent with Figure 1 and Table 1, the 
probability of being self-employed is higher among workers with five or fewer 
years of tenure in the current jobo One reason for this may be that employment 
~ Note, however, that some of the workers who have changed firme might 
have changed their worker class in the current jobo 
~ In an economy of high unemployment, the less educated, and hence the 
less competitive workers may regard self-employment as an alternative to 
scarce paid work. 
~ See Fuchs (1982). 
11 
spells of self-employed workers are shorter than those of wage and salary 
workers.~ An alternative explanation is that, from 1981 to 1985, when 
unemployment soared in Spain, many workers found self-employment as the only 
escape from their joblessness. 
We test this hypothesis, as our informal model suggests, by relating 
duration of unemployment to the probability of current self-employment among 
previous wage and salary workers. Fifty-seven per cent of workers in the 
sample have not experienced unemployment after 1eaving or losing their prior 
jobo In the probit regression, we control for this circumstance by adding a 
dummy variable. 
Column 1 of Table 2 indicates that the dummy for workers without an 
intervening spell of unemployment has a mean effect of 0.22 on the probability 
of shifting to self-employment. v However, given a spell of unemployment, the 
longer the duration of such a spell, the more likely workers are to become 
self-employed: A month out of work translates to a 0.45 percentage point 
e increase in the probability of entering and remaining self-employed. 3 These 
results hold true for males and females, although the marginal probabilities 
are higher for the latter. Furthermore, we find that one point increase in 
unemployment rates across regions significantly lessens the probability of 
self-employment among males by 0.6 percentage points.~ This result turns out 
~ Using the ECVT, we have several ways to shed some light on this 
possible explanation. First, by examining workers who have changed firms, we 
compare the average duration of the previous job for workers in a prior wage 
and salary job (5.5 years), with that of those previously self-employed (10.6 
years). Second, we compare the percentage of current wage and salary workers 
who have never changed firms (38.5\) and that of their self-employed 
counterparts (40.7\). One should keep in mind that, depending on the business 
cycle, the probability of remaining self-employed may change over time. 
Moreover, both the probability of entering and of remaining in self-employment 
helps us to explain workers' selection into self-employment. 
v The mean effect on the probability of a unit change in the independent 
variable is calculated as the coefficient estimates of the probit regression 
times the mean value for the sample of the standard normal density function 
evaluated at z~.
 
3 For a clearer perspective on the probability of entering self-
employment, we considered only workers who have been in the current job for 
less than a year. 80th variables, dummy for absence of unemployment and 
duration of unemployment, resulted with positive and significant coefficients. 
~ Since the regional structure of unemployment has not significantly 
changed in Spain, we used the regional unemployment rate in 1985. 
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to be true only for voluntary movers, as will be seen latero It indicates that 
a depressed local labor market offers less incentives for workers voluntarily 
shifting to self-employrnent. 
The reason for movin~ offers insight into the relationship between 
unemployrnent and self-employrnent, and highlights the role of other variables 
in explaining self-employrnent. According to reasons for moving from the 
previous wage and salary job,31 Table 3 presents the resu1ts of the probit 
regressions for the probabilities of becoming and remaining self-employed. The 
dummy for workers who have not experienced unemployrnent is always significant. 
Duration of unemployrnent, however, is not significant where other reasons for 
moving apply. The increase in the probability to enter self-employrnent after a 
month of unemployrnent is 0.77 percentage points among displaced workers and 
0.51 percentage points among voluntary movers from a prior job. 32 Other 
remarkable results are the following: Variables for tenure in the previous 
job, one firm change and regional unemployrnent rate are significant only for 
voluntary movers. Those displaced workers who lost their jobs because of 
cutback on work are more likely to become self-employed. Among those who 
responded other reasons for change, it is observed that workers who left due 
to retirement, marriage or birth have a higher probability of self-
employrnent." 
~ The very significant negative coefficients of the dummies representing 
reasons for moving among females in Table 2 are due to the fact that the 
omitted reasons, moving because of marriage, giving birth or retirement, 
notably increase the probability of self-employrnent. See Goffe and Scase 
(1986) for an analysis of the married woman and self-employrnent. 
31 The duration of the current job varies across reasons given for leaving 
the previous one: The proportion of workers who have been in the current job 
for less than S years is 60% among displaced workers, 26% among voluntary 
movers, and 40% among those who responded with other reasons for moving. 
Obviously, reason for moving from and into a job is closely related to the 
business cycle. Also, the probabilities of permanency in self-employrnent are 
likely to depend upon the underlying motive for becoming so. 
32 The majority of voluntary movers, 75%, did not experience unemployrnent. 
A possible reason for observing unemployrnent among sorne of the workers who 
moved voluntarily may be that they made a mistake about their work prospects. 
" We ran probit regressions according to occupations in the previous jobo 
The sample wae broken into three categories of workers: skilled laborere, 
unskilled laborers and others. Nothing changed the results indicated earlier. 
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The former results indicate that, once we control for workers who did not 
suffer unemployrnent, duration of unemployrnent significantly increases the 
probability of entering and remaining self-employed.~ Although setting up a 
business takes time, it is unlikely that workers who decide to become self-
employed soon after displacement will report the time spent setting up the 
business as time unemployed. In this respect, the question on duration of 
unemployrnent was formulated in fairly clear terms: "After leaving this job, 
how long did you spend (or are you) out of work and actively looking for a 
job?"~ 
Three issues should be addressed at this point. First, the selection 
bias: Throughout this work we considered only workers who were re-employed at 
survey date. Since those still unemployed are more likely to have a longer 
unemployrnent duration, we are probably understating the transition rate into 
self-employrnent. A way to deal with this problem, not undertaken in this 
work, consists of using duration models where there are three possible 
e outcomes: unemployrnent, dependent employrnent and self-employrnent. The results 
shown in this article suggest an increasing hazard rate for self-employed 
workers. 
Second, endogeneity problems are apparent: Is duration an endogenous 
variable? We argued before that according to our informal model, self-
employrnent reduces average duration of unemployrnent, because some workers stop 
job searching when self-employrnent becomes more profitable than to continue 
searching.~ That can be interpreted as though shorter duration is determined 
by the decision to become self-employed. However, it is the time out of work 
what makes expected income from wage and salary work go down and the entry 
into self-employrnent an optimum decision. 
~ When the self-employed with employees are deleted and, consequently,  
only the self-employed without employees are considered, the effect of 
duration on self-employrnent becomes more significant.  
~ We have insufficient data to answer the question of how much of the 
increase in self-employrnent is accounted for by the increase in unemployrnent 
duration in Spain. 
~ It is also possible that some workers start out as self-employed and 
continue looking for paid work. 
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Third, unobserved heterogeneity: It is always possible that we are not 
able to identify all the sources of heterogeneity in our sample. The fact that 
self-employed workers are more likely to have avoided unemployment after job 
loss tells us that the positive relationship observed between self-employment 
and duration of unemployment cannot be caused solely by heterogeneity. In 
other words, self-employed workers are not necessarily the less able workers 
whose only alternative is to employ themselves. They become self-employed as a 
result of an efficient choice made under some exogenous conditions, e.g., 
scarcity of paid work. 37 
For the sake of robust results, the next section examines the 
relationship between unemployment and self-employment within a different 
institutional context, namely, the United States. 
r 
'-, 
v. Self-Eaployaent Aaong Di.placed Worker. in the united State. 
The United States is one of the OECD countries where self-employment has 
grown the most in the last fifteen years. The proportion of self-employment in 
e the United States is less than half the proportion of self-employment in 
spain. We test how duration of unemployment affects self-employment in the 
u.s. economy, as compared to analogous dynamics in the Spanish economy. 
Differences between labor market institutions in both countries make this 
comparison an insightful one. 
Table 4 reports the results of probit regressions for the probability of 
entry and permanence in self-employment among displaced workers in the United 
States. The sample is restricted to white workers, between 20 and 61 years of 
age, displaced from wage and salary jobs in the period 1981 to 1987, who 
worked full-time in the non-agricultural sector. The entire sample~ is 
composed of 5,282 individuals, of whom 8.16\ entered and remained self-
employed as of the survey dates (1986 and 1988). Self-employed U.S. workers 
are more likely to be males, elder, residing in the Kountain and Pacific 
37 It is unlikely that duration of unemployment is correlated with 
unobserved characteristics which increase the probability of entering and 
remaining self-employed, others than those contemplated in our modelo 
~ Some observations with missing values for some variables were deleted. 
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region, had not collected unemployment insurance, had suffered a longer 
duration of unemployment, had held fewer jobs after displacement, had been 
earning more in the previous job, and had not been included in a group health 
insurance plan. 
When we analyzed workers who had held only one job after displacement, 
nothing substantially changed. However, sorne differences emerged when 
comparing probit regressions by gender. Women are more likely to be self-
employed if they have a college education, had longer tenure in the previous 
job, were displaced in 1983 or before and lived in the Mountain and Pacific 
region. The variable duration of unemployment does not significantly affect 
displaced women's probability of becoming self-employed in the United States. 
As opposed to the results for Spain, u.s. workers who did not experience 
unemployment are not more likely to be self-employed after displacement. 
Nonetheless, according to column 2 of Table 4, one week out of work 
significantly raises the probability of entering and remaining self-employed 
by 0.46 percentage points. Recall that a month of unemployment increases the ( 
probability of self-employment by 0.77 percentage points among displaced 
workers in Spain. Yet, because the data sets are not identical, it is 
difficult to compare the degree to which unemployment duration respectively 
affects self-employment in Spain and the United States. Also, the incidence 
and evolution of unemployment duration and self-employment differ in both 
countries. 
With these limitations in mind, it is possible to sense how differently 
duration of unemployment affects self-employment in Spain and the United 
States. To do that, we concentrate on displaced workers who have experienced 
unemployment. We use the specifications in column 1 of Table 3 for Spain and 
in column 2 of Table 4 for the United States. To avoid the effect of measuring 
unit by which duration of unemployment was reported in both countries, we take 
the logarithm of duration. We obtain that one percent increase in unemployment 
duration raises the probability of self-employment by 0.15 percentage points 
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in the U.S and by 0.17 percentage points in Spain. B Since the probability of 
becoming self-employed is twice as high in Spain than it is in the U.S., we 
can conclude that the elasticity of becoming self-employed with respect to 
duration of unemployment among job losers is higher in the U.S. than it is in 
Spain. 
A result shown in Table 4 merits some comments. We have observed that 
among displaced workers in the United States, previous higher wage earners are 
more likely to become and remain in self-employed. c This result seems 
inconsistent with those obtained by Evans and Leighton (1989), and Evans and 
Jovanovic (1989), using the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men (NLS). 
They find that workers selected into self-employment are relatively poorer 
wage earners. NeverthelesB, there may not be inconsistency between their 
finding and the one reported here, if few NLS workers who shifted to self-
employment did so in the aftermath of displacement. The reason being that it 
is unlikely to find voluntary job separations among relatively higher paid 
workers. If the job is exogenously terminated, more specific human capital,
e 
higher reservation wage, more assets and higher managerial experience should 
be associated with higher paid workers. 
VI. Job Qua1ity of Se1f-Bap10yed Worker. 
The significant relationship between self-employment and unemployment 
suggests that the quality of the jobs which workers have created for 
themselves should be lower than the quality of the jobs obtained by those who 
remain wage and salary workers. As indicators of the quality of the obtained 
job, we take the proportions of workers performing occasional or regular part-
time work, 100king for work, holding another job and the proportion of those 
not covered by Social Security. Table S shows that in Spain, self-employed 
workers without employees are more likely to be in all these categories than 
B The probit coefficients (S.D) and the mean of the standard normal 
density function were the following: for the U.S, 0.104 (0.034) and 1.447; and 
for Spain, 0.186 (0.036) and 0.906. 
C Unfortunately, the Spanish data do not contain information on earnings 
in the previous jobo 
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are wage and salary workers. The same assertion can be made for the U.S. with 
regard to workers in part-time work and those not covered by a group insurance 
plan. This approach in assessing the quality of jobs has the limitation of not 
accounting for factors likely to influence job satisfaction among self-
employed workers: independence, flexibility and expectations of business 
improvement over time. 
In the framework of our model, the positive effect of duration on self-
employrnent implies that the longer the unemployrnent duration, the worse is the 
job match for re-employed workers. 41 Tables 6 and 7 test this prediction. The 
results confirm our hypothesis for Spain and the United States. other results 
indicate that for Spain, younger workers, self-employed workers without 
employees, and workers with shorter tenure in both the previous and the 
current job are more likely to have poorer job match. 
Self-Employment and Earnings in Spain 
For comparable wQrkers earnings provide the best index of job quality as 
so far a pecuniary measure. Table 8 contains the results of estimated earning 
equations for Spain. Only males in full-time jobs have been considered. 42 
Spanish self-employed workers earn less than their wage and salary 
counterparts. When the self-employed are split according to the size of the 
firm, we obtain interesting results: Self-employed workers without employees 
earn about 22\ less than wage and salary workers. Self-employed workers with 
less than six employees do not earn significantly more than wage and salary 
workers. Those who have over six employees earn 26\ more than wage and salary 
workers. 
When wage equations are estimated for self-employed and wage and salary 
workers, sorne additional results are worthy of mention. General experience and 
41 Unemployrnent duration makes workers accept less desirable jobs. The 
finding that the longer unemployed are more likely to become self-employed 
suggests that, absent self-employrnent as an option, less desirable working 
conditions would be observed amonglong-term unemployed workers who find a 
jobo 
~ Information on wages is reported in the ECVT as a coded variable. 
However, we have translated the variable into a continuous one by taking mid-
point of each intervalo 
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tenure in the current job are better compensated in the wage and ealary 
sector. Thie result is consistent with the Lazear and Moore (1984) finding 
that the self-employed have flatter age-earning profi1es. The selection bias 
correction through the inverse Mills ratio turns out to be insignificant and 
has little effect on the resulte. When the variable duration is included in 
the earnings equations, its negative effect is significant among wage and 
salary workere and is not significant among self-employed workers. 
VII. COnc1usion 
The objective of this work has been to introduce unemployment in the 
analysis of selection into eelf-employment. As the primary framework for our 
investigation we incorporated self-employment as plausible outcome into a job 
search model, in which workers learn in the process of looking for work. For 
both Spain and the United States, we have found that duration of unemployment 
significantly affects workers' decision to become se1f-employed. Such a result 
is consistent with the prediction of the modelo Further inquiry into the kinds 
of jobs held by self-employed workers showed that those jobs have desirable 
characteristics: part-time work, absence of Social Security coverage, etc. At 
the same time, we found that for Spain, most of the self-employed workers are 
the only employees of their firms, obtaining much less income than comparable 
wage and salary workers. 
This work leads us to consider several aspects of self-employment which 
call for future research. First, more investigation is needed to assess 
whether eelf-employment that stems from unemployment contributes to solve or 
to camouflage joblessness. Second, a way to better understand 
entrepreneurship, as related to unemployment, is to study the formation and 
evolution of small firms, above all those created by unemployed workers. 
Unemployment can be a catalyst for talented entrepreneurs who otherwise would 
not have decided to take the risk associated with creating a business. Third, 
the study of earnings prior to self-employment, income obtained from self-
employment and receipt of unemployment insurance, would be helpful in shedding 
more light on the worker's decision to enter self-employment. 
19 
What policy implications can we derive from our findings? To have a clear 
policy, more probing analyses are necessary. Our finding that small businesses 
grow in economic downturns may indicate that self-employment represents a 
solution to workers' unemployment problem. More importantly, small businesses 
can greatly contribute to economic growth and the continuous generation of new 
jobs.~ However, the relatively poorer job quality of self-employment casts 
doubt on the efficiency of a public policy that fosters self-employment.~ 
While this research has provided some insight into our understanding of 
self-employment, it has left important questions for future investigations: 
Should self-employment be given public support? If the answer is yes, what 
types of economic policy should be adopted? To respond to these questions a 
better knowledge of the evolution of business created by self-employed workers 
~. should be pursued. 
~ Yet it remains to be sean how seedling firms, sown by the hardship of 
unemployment, grow at the impulse of subsequent economic recovery. That 
recovery, in turn, can be enhanced by a network of newly established 
enterprises. 
~ It can be argued that public incentives for self-employment reduces the 
selection into self-employment and, therefore, increases the businesses' 
failure rateo The opposite argument would defend public assistance in 
preventing business failure. A way to reconcile both positions may be to give 
public support only to already established businesses. See Balkin (1989) for 
an analysis of self-employment for disadvantaged workers. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics for ECVT Sample 
Mean (S. D. ) 
Wage and Salary Seif-Employed
Variable Description Workers Workers 
Male =1 if male .7152 .8015 
Married =1 if married .7116 .8027 
Head =1 if household head .6809 .7514 
Age = age 38.2268 (11.8) 42.0615 (11. 7)
Age>=65 =1 if age>=65 .0047 .0215 
Exper. = age-educ-6 24.3929 (13.4) 28.9048 (13.4) 
Educ.<6 =1 <6 years of school .2769 .3303 
Educ.=6 =1 if primary school .2824 .3202 
Educ.=8 =1 if pre-secondary .1618 .1369 
Educ.=12 =1 if secondary school .1544 .1249 
Educ.=15 =1 if pre-university .0634 .0462 
Educ.=17 =1 if university .0608 .0412 
Duration of previous and current 1ob: 
Tenure = years of tenure in the 4.6467 (5.3) 6.4309 (6.6) 
previous job 
Senior<l =1 if less than 1 year in .1855 .1230 
the current job 
Seniorl-2 =1 if >=1 and <=2 years .0667 .0868 
Senior2-5 =1 if >2 and <=5 years .1407 .1864 
Senior>5 =1 if more than 5 years .6069 .6036 
e Region ur = region unemployment rate 21.7357 (5.1) 21.2253 (5.2) 
Durat.=O =1 if not unemployment .5542 .6442 
Months = unemployment duration 7.7037 (16.7) 8.9067 (20.1) 
unemployed in months 
Reasons for and number of firm changes: 
Quit =1 if quit the job .5325 .5383 
Retired =1 if retired .0013 .0088 
To marry =1 if married .0358 .0697 
Birth =1 if gave birth .0111 .0095 
Military =1 if went military service .0277 .0215 
Displac. =1 if displaced .3131 .2701 
Fired =1 if was individualy fired .0506 .0500 
Bankrup =1 if bankruptcy .1001 .0849 
Cutback =1 if cut-back on work .0218 .0323 
Endcont =1 if end of contract .1404 .1026 
Not def. =1 if not defined .0661 .0659 
Not ans. =1 if no answer .0120 .0158 
APPENDIX 1 (Continued) 
Variable DefinitionB and DeBcriptive StatiBticB for ECVT Sample 
Mean (S.D.) 
Wage and saiary self-Employed 
Variable DeBcription WorkerB WorkerB 
Jobchang=l=l if changed firmB once .1771 .2149 
Jobchang=2""1 " twice .2674 .2473 
Jobchang=3""1 " three times .2179 .2022 
Jobchang>3=1 " four or more times .3365 .3354 
Self w/e =1 if Belf-emp10yed without .8034 
employees 
Self 1-5e =1 if 1-5 emp10yees .1559 
Self >5e =1 if more than S employees .0355 
Log wage '"' log of the monthly 10.73 (.51) 10.59 (.57) 
net earnings in current job 
N 6080 1577 
e 
( 
',-, 
APPENDIX 2 
Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics for 1986-1988 DWS 
Samp1e 
Means (S.D.) 
Wage and saiary Self-Empioyed
Variable Description Workers Workers 
Male =1 if male .6615 .7703 
Married =1 if married .6825 .7703 
Age = age 35.6685 (10.3) 37.6496 (9.5)
Educ.<:o:::12 =1 if <-12 years of schoo1 .3772 .3480 
Educ.=13 -1 if 13 " .2747 .2552 
Educ.-14 -1 if 14 " .1020 .0765 
Educ.-15 -1 if 15 " .0729 .0696 
Educ.=16 =1 if 16 " .0682 .1020 
Educ.>=17 =1 if 17+ " .1047 .1484 
Reasons for iob loss: 
C10se =1 if p1ant closing .5291 .4965 
Slack :0:::1 if slack work .3318 .3387 
Abolish =1 if abolished position .1374 .1647 
or shift 
Tenure = tenure in the prior job 4.6996 (6.1) 4.9489 (6.0)
Ydisp.>83 :0:::1 if displaced after 1983 .6413 .6403 
Region of residence at survey date: 
Region1 =1 if New England .1978 .1600 
and Middle Atlantic 
Region2 =1 if E-N Central .2661 .2296 
e and W-N Central 
Region3 =1 if S Atlantic, E-S .3024 .3062 
Central and W-S Central 
Region4 =1 if Mountain and Pacific .2335 .3039 
Moved :0:::1 if moved to other city 
or county .2234 .2018 
Advnotice =1 if given advanced notice .5256 .5591 
Collec.UI =1 if collected .5656 .5127 
unemployment insurance 
Durat.=O =1 if not unemployment .1506 .1740 
Weeks .. unemployment duration 17.5273 (23.4) 19.0464 (25.1) 
unemployed in weeks 
Log wage = log of prior job 5.7752 (5.8) 5.9949 (6.0) 
weekly earnings 
Notcover. = not covered by any group .2803 .2830 
health insurance plan 
in previous job 
# jobs = number of jobs held 1.7019 (1.1) 1.5104 (1.0) 
since displacement 
N 4851 431 
TABLE 1 
Current Class of Workers by Year of Entry, Conditional 
on Being Employed. 
Frequency 
(Row Percentage) 
[Column Percentage] 
Wage-Salary 
Workers 
<"1980 3690 
(79.,49 ) 
[60.69] 
1981-83 856 
(74.43) 
[14.08] 
r 
1984 406 
(74.77) 
[ 6.68] 
e 
1985 1128 
(85.33) 
[18.55] 
Total 6080 
(79.40) 
[100.00] 
Self-Empl. 
With 
Employess 
214 
( 4.61) 
[69.03] 
51 
( 4.43) 
[16.45] 
14 
2.58) 
4.52] 
31 
( 2.34) 
[10.00] 
310 
( 4.05) 
[100.00] 
Self-Emp1. 
Without Total 
Employees 
738 4642 
(15.90) (100.00) 
[58.25) [ 60.62] 
243 1150 
(21.13) (100.00) 
[19.18] [ 15.02] 
123 543 
(22.65) (100.00) 
[ 9.71] [ 7.09) 
163 1322 
(12.33) (100.00) 
[12.87] [ 17.27) 
1267 7657 
(16.55) (100.00) 
[100.00] [100.00] 
Note: The sample is composed of workers who have moved from a 
previous non-agricultural wage and salary jobo 
Source: ECVT. 
TABLE 2 
Probit Regressions on the Probabi1ity of Enteringr' 
Se1f-Emp1oyment Among Wage and Sa1ary Workers in 
Prior Job. Spain. ECVT. 
Al! Workers Males Fema1es 
e Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t 
Constant -2.5359 (-9.79) -2.0391 (-6.73) -3.4064 (-6.52) 
Ma1e .3224 ( 7.37) 
Married .0817 ( 1.87 ) -.0605 (-1.14) .3145 ( 3.86) 
Age .0519 ( 4.45) .0468 ( 3.42) .0774 ( 3.22) 
Age2 -.0005 (-3.55) -.0004 (-2.61) -.0007 (-2.70) 
Age>"65 '.8859 ( 4.76) 1.1025 ( 4.58) .8840 ( 2.57) 
Educ.=6 .0436 ( 0.98) .0137 ( 0.27) .1665 ( 1.63) 
Educ.-8 -.0483 (-0.85) -.0785 (-1.22) .1126 ( 0.91) 
Educ.=12 -.0680 (-1.17) -.1104 (-1.69) .1300 ( 1.01) 
Educ.=15 -.1546 (-1.94) -.2227 (-2.33) .0329 ( 0.21) 
Educ.=17 -.2611 (-3.15) -.3685 (-3.79) .0724 ( 0.44) 
r 
'-,  
Tenure .0272 ( 3.97) .0290 ( 3.84) .0267 ( 1.48) 
Tenure2 -.0005 (-2.24) -.0005 (-1.95) -.0010 (-1.36) 
Senior<l .1643 ( 2.87) .1066 ( 1.56) .2596 ( 2.42) 
Seniorl-2 .4685 ( 6.82) .4266 ( 5.24) .5697 ( 4.37) 
Senior2-5 .4124 ( 8.16) .4174 ( 7.06) .4173 ( 4.19) 
Region ur -.0100 (-3.05) -.0104 (-2.82) -.0067 (-0.91) 
Durat ...O .3298 ( 7.10) .3084 ( 5.68) .3750 ( 3.85) 
Months .0068 ( 6.09) .0062 ( 3.68) .0063 ( 3.90)e 
unemp10yed 
Jobchang"l .1818 ( 3.57) .1474 ( 2.49) .2989 2.80) 
Jobchang"2 -.0041 (-0.09) -.0562 (-1.07 ) .1842 1. 78) 
Jobchang=3 -.0159 (-0.33) -.0177 (-0.33) .0329 ( 0.28) 
Quit -.1481 (-3.08) -.0447 (-0.73) -.2671 (-3.19) 
Disp1ac. -.1544 (-2.84) -.0545 (-0.82) -.3374 (-3.02) 
r 
'-..'  Log likel. -3664.6 -2850.2 -788.84 
P .206 .225 .153 
N 7657 5613 2044 
Note: The t-statIstics are presented In parentheses. 
," 
rTABLE 3 
Probit Regressione on the Probabi1ity of Entering 
ro 
'0 
Se1f-Emp1oyment Among Wage and Sa1ary Workers in 
Prior Job. Spain. ECVT. 
Vo1untary Other Reason 
e Displaced Movere for Moving 
Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t 
Constant -3.2485 (-7.01) -2.6597 (-7.00) -2.9684 (-4.80) 
Ma1e .5203 ( 5.43) .4142 ( 6.53) .3415 ( 2.81) 
Married .·0266 ( 0.34) .0977 ( 1. 55) .0587 ( 0.53) 
Age .0704 ( 3.28) .0522 ( 3.06) .0633 ( 2.27) 
Age2 -.0007 (-2.97) -.0004 (-2.17) -.0006 (-2.05) 
Age>=65 .7298 ( 1.46) 1.0830 ( 3.98) .6333 ( 1.79) 
Educ.=6 .1885 ( 2.22) -.0075 (-0.12) -.0257 (-0.24) 
Educ.=8 .0232 ( 0.21) -.0806 (-1.01) -.0186 (-0.14) 
Educ.=12 .2297 ( 2.14) -.1920 (-2.38) -.2202 (-1.50) 
'- Educ.=15 .2146 ( 1. 37) -.2037 (-1.95) -.4736 (-2.12) 
Educ."'17 -.1670 (-0.93) -.3095 (-2.89) -.3070 (-1.45) 
Tenure -.0029 (-0.21) .0399 ( 3.79) .0240 ( 1.49) 
Tenure2 .0002 ( 0.45) -.0008 (-2.04) -.0006 (-1.18) 
Senior<l -.0315 (-0.35) .3770 ( 3.95) .0710 ( 0.54) 
Seniorl-2 .3745 ( 3.48) .6069 ( 5.37) .2023 ( 1.27 ) 
Senior2-5 .2499 ( 2.77) .5771 ( 8.06) .2609 ( 2.04)e Region ur -.0040 (-0.69) -.0170 (-3.67) -.0005 (-0.06) 
Durat."'O • 5111 ( 6.41) .1470 ( 2.14) .4566 ( 4.16) 
Months .0099 ( 4.98) .0072 ( 3.75) .0032 ( 1.59) 
unemp10yed 
Jobchang=l .1494 ( 1.44) .2123 ( 3.06) .2332 ( 1. 93) 
Jobchang=2 -.0066 (-0.07) -.0247 (-0.39) .1419 ( 1.24) 
Jobchang=3 .0298 ( 0.34) -.0225 (-0.34) .0294 ( 0.24) 
Fired .0843 ( 0.89) 
Bankrup -.0624 (-0.72) 
Cutback .2546 ( 2.09) 
Retired .9108 ( 2.95) 
To marry or give birth .4167 ( 3.44) 
Military -.1089 (-0.81) 
Log likeL -1033.0 -1925.4 -635.5 
,.. 
P .183 .208 .243 
N 2330 4037 1240 
Note: The t-statietics are presented in parentheses. 
TABLE 4 
Probit Regressions on the Probability of Entering
" \..  Self-Employrnent Among Displaced Workers in the U.S. 
Displaced Worker Survey 1986-1988. 
( 
e 
Have Held Only One Job Since Displacement 
Entire Sample All Workers Males Females 
Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t 
Constant 
Male 
-4.3610 
.1654 
(-9.32) 
( 2.62) 
-4.7615 
.2156 
(-7.82) 
( 2.65) 
-4.5734 (-6.36) -4.8893 (-3.76) 
Married .1134 ( 1. 83) .0969 ( 1.19) .0287 ( 0.28) .2133 ( 1.39) 
Age .0538 ( 2.58) .0640 ( 2.37) .0698 ( 2.18) .0597 ( 1.06) 
Age2 
Educ.=13 
-.0005 
.0075 
(-2.30) 
( 0.11) 
-.0007 
-.0183 
(-2.28) 
(-0.21) 
-.0007 
.0323 
(-1.97) 
( 0.31) 
-.0008 
-.2349 
(-1.19) 
(-1.27) 
Educ.=14 -.1561 (-1.57) -.3212 (-2.32) -.3748 (-2.24) -.2927 (-1.09) 
Educ.=15 -.0550 (-0.51) -.0316 (-0.23) -.0352 (-0.22) -.0434 (-0.15) 
Educ.=16 .1179 ( 1.17) .0691 ( 0.55) -.1630 (-1.05) .6056 ( 2.51) 
Educ.>-17 .0519 ( 0.58) -.0027 (-0.02) -.0204 (-0.15) .0365 ( 0.13) 
Slack .0566 ( 0.96) .0242 ( 0.31) -.0111 (-0.12) .1119 ( 0.65) 
Abolish .1161 ( 1.53) .1649 ( 1. 72) .0627 ( 0.53) .3261 ( 1.86) 
Tenure .0079 ( 0.65) .0263 ( 1.72) .0125 ( 0.73) .1172 ( 2.55) 
Tenure2 -.0005 (-1.25) -.0011 (-1.97) -.0007 (-1.23) -.0053 (-2.15) 
Ydisp.>83 -.0522 (-0.89) -.0058 (-0.07) .1039 ( 1.13) -.3333 (-2.09) 
Region2 .0517 ( 0.63) .1294 ( 1.26) .1259 ( 1.08) .2352 ( 0.98) 
Region3 .1282 ( 1.64) .1840 ( 1. 86) .1595 ( 1.41) .3446 ( 1. 52 ) 
Region4 .2196 ( 2.73) .2809 ( 2.71) .1592 ( 1.31) .6561 ( 2.93) 
Moved -.0774 (-1.19) -.1348 (-1.46) -.0832 (-0.82) -.3542 (-1.40) 
Advnotice .0641 ( 1.22) .0688 ( 1. 01) .0772 ( 0.97) .0300 ( 0.21) 
Collec. UI -.1586 (-2.57) - .1159 (-1.46) -.1902 (-2.09) .0739 ( 0.41) 
Durat.=O .0054 ( 0.06) .0737 ( 0.75) -.0107 (-0.09) .3120 ( 1. 52) 
Weeks .0029 (2.47) .0036 ( 2.34) .0038 ( 2.02) .0027 ( 0.88) 
unemployed 
# jobs 
Log wage 
-.0744 
.2765 
(-2.80) 
( 4.82) .2787 3.73) .2728 3.18) .2715 1.67) 
Notcover. .1741 ( 2.69) .2619 3.11) .2742 2.73) .2057 1.26) 
Log like1. -1423.8 -875.7 -650.7 -206.3 
" 
P .0816 .0938 .1086 .0645 
N 5282 2963 1971 992 
Note: The sample is composed of whIte workers who were dIsplaced 
from full-time non-agricultural wage and salary jobs. 
The t-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
TABLE 5 
The Job Quality by Class of Worker in Spain 
(Percentage of workers in each category) 
Wage 
AH Workers and Salary 
Part-Time Workers lS.40\ 17.7S\ 
Looking For Work 5.22\ 4.9S\ 
Holding Another Job 21.25\ 20.63\ 
No Social Security 15.31\ 14.11\ 
Number 7657 60S0 
Source: ECVT. 
Self-Empl. Self-EmpL 
With Without 
Employees Employees 
7.42\ 24.07\ 
1.94\ 7.1S\ 
11.94\ 26.52\ 
9.35\ 22.49\ 
310 1267 
TABLE 6 
Probit Regressions on Job Quality of Self-Employed Workers in Spain 
Self-Employed Males. ECVT. 
Dependent Part-Time Looking For Holding Not Social 
Variable: Work =1 Work -1 Another Job =1 Security -1 
", Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff • t 
Constant 1. 4911 ( 2.34) -.9595 (-1.10) .9929 ( 1.64) 1.3264 ( 2.00) 
Married -.2249 (-1.96) .1808 ( 1.11) .1178 ( 1.04) -.3511 (-3.01) 
Age -.0986 (-3.58) -.0100 (-0.25) -.0829 (-3.13) -.0971 (-3.40) 
Age2 .0011 ( 3.79) -.0000 (-0.00) .0009 ( 3.31) .0010 ( 3.48) 
Educ.=6 -.2824 (-2.55) -.2565 (-1. 68) -.0602 (-0.57) -.3014 (-2.40) 
Educ.-8 -.3467 (-2.2'1) -.0388 (-0.20) .1278 ( 0.93) -.0348 (-0.22) 
Educ.-12 -.5103 (-3.03) -.1493 (-0.73) -.0895 (-0.60) -.1291 (-0.77) 
Educ.=15 .0292 ( 0.13) .1632 ( 0.59) .1824 ( 0.86) -.0221 (-0.09) 
Educ.=17 -.2096 (-0.84) -.5883 (-1.26) .5089 ( 2.44) .7079 ( 3.34) 
Tenure -.0366 (-2.31) -.0226 (-1. 02) -.0373 (-2.54) -.0404 (-2.32) 
Tenure2 .0011 ( 2.31) .0006 ( 0.95) .0010 ( 2.28) .0010 ( 1.85)
(- Senior<l .4005 ( 2.66) .1836 ( 0.97) .3349 ( 2.33) .3710 ( 2.35)
'-
Seniorl-2 .0538 ( 0.31) .0317 ( 0.14) -.0021 (-0.01) .1719 ( 0.96) 
Senior2-5 .0246 ( 0.18) -.0658 (-0.38) .0589 ( 0.49) .0733 ( 0.53) 
Region ur .0064 ( 0.78) -.0009 (-0.09) -.0019 (-0.24) -.0008 (-0.09) 
Durat.=O -.2709 (-2.18) -.3040 (-1.90) -.1667 (-1.43) -.0547 (-0.41) 
Months .0073 ( 2.16) .0069 ( 1. 72) .0069 ( 2.07) .0094 ( 2.57) 
unemployed 
Self with e -.5382 (-3.93) -.4866 (-2.52) -.4484 (-3.89) -.3414 (-2.52)e 
Displac. .1317 ( 1.28) .2449 ( 1.84) .2149 ( 2.24) .0752 ( 0.68) 
Jobchang=l -.1826 (-1.44) -.0751 (-1.10) -.1036 (-0.92) -.0154 (-0.12) 
Log likel. -512.3 -272 .1 -618.8 -442.1 
P .176 .065 .223 .138 
N 1264 1264 1264 1264 
r-
,-, ' Note: The t-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
e 
rTABLE 7 
Probit Regressions on Job Quality in the U.S. 
Males. 1986-1988 DWS.e 
Dependent Not Covered By Any Group Health 
Variable: Part-Time Work -1 1nsurance Plan in Current Job-1 
e seif-Employed Wage and salary se1f-Employed Wage and Salary 
Coeff • t Coeff. t Coeff. t CoeU. t 
Constant .6718 ( 0.41) .4692 ( 0.86) 1.7050 ( 1.16) .0303 ( 0.06) 
Married -.3958 (-1.78) -.2758 (-3.78) -.3461 (-1.70) -.3245 (-5.48) 
Age .0311 ( 0.43) -.0479 (-1.93) .0178 ( 0.27) .0087 ( 0.42) 
Age2 -.0002 (-0.27) .0006 ( 1.94) -.0003 (-0.42) -.0001 (-0.51) 
Educ.-13 -.4865 (-2.09) .0636 ( 0.75) -.3254 (-1.60) -.0310 (-0.47) 
Educ.-14 -.1844 (-0.52) .0289 ( 0.24) -.1856 (-0.63) -.2908 (-3.07) 
Educ.-15 -.0312 (-0.09) .0501 ( 0.37) -.7152 (-2.24) -.2457 (-2.29) 
Educ.=16 -.6837 (-1.90) -.1214 (-0.78) -.6106 (-2.06) -.2893 (-2.55) 
Educ.>=17 -.4953 (-1.73) .1679 ( 1. 41) -.3609 (-1.47) -.3806 (-3.78) 
r'
, Slack -.3259 (-1.65) .0406 ( 0.56) -.0454 (-0.27) .0943 ( 1.66)
- Abolish .1411 ( 0.54) -.0778 (-0.72) -.2920 (-1.26) -.1985 (-2.30) 
Tenure -.1010 (-2.56) -.0211 (-1.47) .0605 ( 1.68) -.0112 (-0.89) 
Tenure2 .0030 ( 2.15) .0013 ( 2.85) -.0028 (-2.02) -.0001 (-0.31) 
Ydisp.>83 .1403 ( 0.71) .2113 ( 2.76) -.0952 (-0.56) .3825 ( 6.33) 
Region2 -.0908 (-0.32) .1959 ( 1. 91) .3778 ( 1. 57) .2113 ( 2.59) 
Region3 -.0496 (-0.18) .1103 ( 1.05) .9734 ( 4.22) .3583 ( 4.48) 
Region4 .3618 ( 1. 34) .3591 ( 3.42) .6113 ( 2.58) .4211 ( 5.06)e 
Moved -.4224 (-1.86) -.0227 (-0.29) -.0045 (-0.02) .1037 ( 1. 72) 
Advnotice .2244 ( 1. 26) -.1113 (-1. 70) .1268 ( 0.81) -.1399 (-2.69) 
Collee. U1 -.0352 (-0.18) -.1356 (-1.74) -.2696 (-1.59) -.0522 (-0.84) 
Durat.=O -.2866 (-1.06) -.1032 (-0.94) -.2132 (-0.97) -.0685 (-0.81) 
Weeks .0107 ( 2.80) .0073 ( 5.04) .0083 ( 2.28) .0045 ( 3.67) 
unemployed 
,- # jobs .0356 ( 0.43) .0733 ( 2.53) .0683 ( 0.89) .1360 ( 5.89) 
,,, Log wage -.2968 (-1.57) -.2218 (-3.25) -.3277 (-2.01) -.2296 (-4.08) 
Notcover. .0711 ( 0.34) .2663 ( 3.35) .3190 ( 1. 68) .4864 ( 7.77) 
Log likel. -144.9 -910.7 -195.7 -1573.7 
A 
P .205 .093 .554 .252 
N 332 3209 332 3209 
Note: The t-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
e TABLE 8 
OLS Estimates of Earning Equations for Self-Employed 
e 
,-. 
'--
e 
e 
,. 
'--.. 
and Wage/Salary Workers. Full-Time Male Workers 
(Cep. Varo : Log Net Monthly Earnings) 
AH Workers self-Employed Wage and Salary 
Head .1225 .2455 .2346 .1002 .0981 
( 5.62) ( 3.94) ( 3.77) ( 4.36) ( 4.29) 
Exper. .0217 .0177 .0184 .0207 .0208 
( 8.75 ) ( 2.23) ( 2.33) ( 7.82) ( 7.86) 
Exper.2 -.0003 -.0003 -.0003 -.0003 -.0003 
(-8.40) (-3.00) (-3.10) (-6.88) (-6.95) 
Educ.=6 .1111 .1506 .1522 .1100 .1066 
( 6.48) ( 3.25) ( 3.30) ( 6.04) ( 5.87) 
Educ.=8 .2239 .2493 .2526 .2260 .2248 
(10.24) ( 4.00) ( 4.07) ( 9.87) ( 9.84) 
Educ.=12 .4167 .4239 .4196 .4230 .4198 
(17.50) ( 5.97) ( 5.94) (17.12) (17.02) 
Educ.=15 .7106 .6229 .6082 .7304 .7265 
(22.17) ( 5.85) ( 5.73) (22.33) (22.25) 
Educ.=17 .8600 .9889 .9744 .8500 .8465 
(25.74) ( 9.28) ( 9.19) (24.79) (24.69) 
Seniorl-2 .0108 .0088 -.0061 .0008 -.0001 
( 0.35) ( 0.10) (-0.07) ( 0.02) (-0.00) 
Senior2-5 .0446 .0467 .0296 .0401 .0353 
( 1. 76) ( 0.63) ( 0.40) ( 1. 51) ( 1.33) 
Senior>5 .0904 .0444 -.0023 .1100 .0930 
( 4.01) ( 0.64) (-0.03) ( 4.69) ( 3.93) 
Quit .0600 .1465 .1381 .0435 .0236 
( 3.07) ( 2.72) ( 2.58) ( 2.10) ( 1.12) 
Cisplac. -.0581 -.0114 .0217 -.0702 -.0616 
(-2.71) (-0.19) ( 0.35) (-3.12) (-2.71) 
TABLE 8 (Continued) 
OLS Estimates of Earning Equations for Self-Employed 
and Wage/Salary Workers. Full-Time Male Workers 
(Dep. Var.: Log Net Monthly Earnings) 
All Workers Self-Employed Wage and Salary 
Self w/e -.2168 
(-12.02) 
Self 1-5e .0199 
( 0.61) 
Self >5e .2640 
( 4;29) 
Durat.=O .0803 
(1. 42) 
.0442 
(2.48) 
Months 
unemployed 
-.0027 
(-1.41) 
-.0016 
(-2.46) 
Lambda .0597 
(0.51) 
.1020 
(0.86) 
Constant 10.28 
(189.9) 
9.94 
(47.3) 
9.89 
(44.8) 
10.32 
(183.9) 
10.32 
(182.2) 
Adj. R-Square 
N 
.329 
4340 
.230 
823 
.238 
823 
.336 
3517 
.341 
3517 
Note: The t-statistIes are presented In parentheses.  
All equations inelude 8 dummies for seetors of the previous jobo 
l:fI Wage and Salary EJ. Employers • Self-Employed 
• Sel f-Empl. Agrie. !il Others 
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